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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Nous étudions ici le problème de positionnement de deux biens publics pour un 
groupe d’agents avec des préférences unimodales sur un intervalle. Une alternative 
spécifie un emplacement pour chaque bien public. Dans Miyagawa (1998), chaque agent 
consomme seulement son bien public préféré sans rivalité. Nous étendons les 
préférences de manière lexicographique et caractérisons les classes de préférences à 
sommet unique par l’optimalité au sens de Pareto et la domination par remplacement. Ce 
résultat est assez différent de la caractérisation correspondante faite par 
Miyagawa (2001a). 
 
Mots clés : préférences unimodales, biens publics multiples, lexicographique, domination 
par remplacement 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with 
single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each 
public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public 
good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the 
class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-
domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization 
by Miyagawa (2001a). 
 
Key words : single-peaked preferences, multiple public goods, lexicographic, 
replacement-domination 
 
 
1 Introduction
Hotelling (1929) considers two competing businesses choosing where to locate on a
street. He assumes that the businesses are identical and each individual patronizes
only the one that is closest to where he lives. Miyagawa (1998) is the rst who studies
this model from a normative prospective and identies rules on the basis of desirable
properties. He considers the problem of a state government having to choose two
locations where to build two identical public facilities. An alternative species for
each of the two public goods a location. Agents have single-peaked preferences on
some interval of possible locations and consume the public goods without rivalry:
given two alternatives, an agent prefers an alternative to another if there is a location
which he prefers to each of the locations of the other alternative. We call this extension
of single-peaked preferences from the set of possible locations to the set of alternatives
its max-extension.
1
There are environments in which agents compare alternatives dierently. At each
point of time when an individual desires to consume the public good, he uses exactly
one public good and therefore he has a single-peaked preference relation over the
interval. However, sometimes it is not possible for him to consume the public good
at his most preferred location. This could be due to several reasons, for example the
good is used by other agents and therefore congested, or the good at his most preferred
location is out of service. But primarily each agent consumes the good at his most
preferred location. One example is where the town government locates two identical
libraries on a street. If a certain book is not available at the rst choice library of an
individual who wants to borrow it, then he has to consume his second choice library.
In these contexts we propose the lexicographic-extension of preferences
2
: given two
alternatives, rst an agent compares the most preferred locations of each of the two
alternatives, and if there is a tie, then he compares the other locations. It turns out
that this feature of preferences brings about results that are considerably dierent
1
The model is further studied in Ehlers (2001) and Miyagawa (2001a,b). Further studies of
the location of multiple public goods with dierent preferences are Barbera and Bevia (1999) and
Bogomolnaia and Nicolo (1999).
2
Dutta and Masso (1997) study two-sided matching when workers have lexicographic preferences.
Each worker rst compares rms and second co-workers.
1
from Miyagawa (2001a).
A basic requirement is Pareto-optimality, meaning that only ecient alternatives
are chosen. Pareto-optimality is stronger in Miyagawa (2001a) than in our model.
Indeed, except for preference proles at which all agents have the same peak, each
alternative that is Pareto-optimal with respect to the max-extension is also Pareto-
optimal with respect to the lexicographic-extension.
Our main property is a notion of fairness. If the environment of an economy
changes, then the welfares of all agents who are not responsible for this change are
aected in the same direction: either all weakly gain or all weakly lose. As a variable
parameter of an economy which may change over time, we consider preferences. Sol-
idarity applied to such situations says that when the preference relation of an agent
changes, then the welfares of all other agents are aected in the same direction. This
replacement principle is called welfare-domination under preference-replacement, or
simply replacement-domination.
3
In dierent settings the \replacement principle" has been studied.
4
It seems to be
a general feature of this property that in any model any class of rules characterized
by replacement-domination and certain other properties is restricted. The review of
Thomson (1999) supports this statement. For two pure public goods and the max-
extension, Miyagawa (2001a) shows that there are only two rules satisfying Pareto-
optimality and replacement-domination: the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule
(for more details see Section 3). When considering the lexicographic-extension of pref-
erences and therefore weakening Pareto-optimality, we show that Pareto-optimality
and replacement-domination admit a large class of rules.
Each rule satisfying these properties is described by means of a xed continuous
and single-peaked binary relation over the set of locations. For each preference prole
such a rule chooses one location to be a most preferred peak in the peak prole
according to the xed single-peaked relation. The second location is indierent to
3
Moulin (1987) introduces replacement-domination in the context of binary choice with quasi-
linear preferences. He calls it \agreement".
4
It has been studied in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (Barbera, Jackson,
and Neme, 1997; Thomson, 1997), in classical exchange economies (Sprumont and Zhou, 1999), in
economies with indivisible goods and monetary transfers (Thomson, 1998), and in one public good
economies (Thomson, 1993; Vohra, 1999; Ehlers and Klaus, 2001).
2
this peak according to the xed single-peaked relation such that, if Pareto-optimality
is not violated, the locations belong to opposite sides of the peak of the xed relation.
We call these rules single-peaked preference rules and characterize them by Pareto-
optimality and replacement-domination.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the general
model and the axioms. Section 3 presents the denition and the characterization of
the single-peaked preference rules. Section 4 contains the proof.
2 The Model
Let N  f1; : : : ; ng, n 2 N , be the set of agents. Each agent i 2 N is equipped with
a single-peaked and continuous preference relation R
i
over [0; 1]. By I
i
we denote the
indierence relation associated with R
i
, and by P
i
the corresponding strict preference
relation. Single-peakedness means that there exists a location, called the peak of R
i
and denoted by p(R
i
), such that for all x; y 2 [0; 1], if x < y  p(R
i
) or x > y  p(R
i
),
then yP
i
x. By R we denote the set of all single-peaked preferences over [0; 1], and
by R
N
the set of (preference) proles R  (R
i
)
i2N
such that for all i 2 N , R
i
2 R.
Given S  N , R
S
denotes the restriction (R
i
)
i2S
of R 2 R
N
to S. Given R 2 R
N
,
p(R) denotes the smallest peak in the prole (p(R
i
))
i2N
, and p(R) the greatest peak
in the prole (p(R
i
))
i2N
.
We choose the locations for two identical public goods in [0; 1]. Let M  f1; 2g.
Each agent has the freedom to choose the public goods he prefers. Therefore, the order
in which we locate the facilities is irrelevant. An alternative is a tuple x  (x
1
; x
2
)
such that 0  x
1
 x
2
 1. We denote by [0; 1]
M
the set of alternatives. Note that
(1; 0) is not an alternative.
Each agent compares two alternatives via the lexicographic preference relation over
[0; 1]
M
induced by his single-peaked preference relation over [0,1].
Lexicographic-Extension of Preferences: Let i 2 N and R
i
2 R. Given two
alternatives x; y 2 [0; 1]
M
and two permutations ;  of M such that x
(1)
R
i
x
(2)
and
y
(1)
R
i
y
(2)
, x is lexicographically strictly preferred to y if and only if either x
(1)
P
i
y
(1)
or (x
(1)
I
i
y
(1)
and x
(2)
P
i
y
(2)
). Furthermore, x is lexicographically indierent to y if
3
and only if x
(1)
I
i
y
(1)
and x
(2)
I
i
y
(2)
. 
Abusing notation, we use the same symbols to denote preferences over possible
locations and lexicographic preferences over alternatives. When we extend preferences
lexicographically, weak upper contour sets are neither closed nor open, and non-
convex. Furthermore, indierence sets only contain a nite number of alternatives.
Figure 1 illustrates this fact.
[Figure 1 enters around here.]
We also introduce Miyagawa's max-extension of preferences from [0,1] to [0; 1]
M
.
Max-Extension of Preferences, R
max
i
: Let i 2 N and R
i
2 R. Given two
alternatives x; y 2 [0; 1]
M
and two permutations ;  of M such that x
(1)
R
i
x
(2)
and
y
(1)
R
i
y
(2)
, x is maximally strictly preferred to y, xP
max
i
y, if and only if x
(1)
P
i
y
(1)
.
Furthermore, x is maximally indierent to y, xI
max
i
y, if and only if x
(1)
I
i
y
(1)
. 
Remark 2.1 In Figure 1 the closure of the weak upper contour set of R
1
at (0.2,0.6)
is the weak upper contour set of R
max
1
at (0.2,0.6). It is easy to see that this true for
all x 2 [0; 1]
M
such that p(R
1
) =2 fx
1
; x
2
g. If p(R
1
) 2 fx
1
; x
2
g, then the indierence
set of R
max
1
at x consists of the two line segments [0; 0:5] f0:5g and f0:5g [0:5; 1].
If x
1
= 0:5, then the weak upper contour set of the lexicographic R
1
at x consists
of the two line segments [1  x
2
; 0:5] f0:5g and f0:5g  [0:5; x
2
]. As we will show,
this \slight" change in weak upper contour sets and indierence sets brings about
conclusions that are considerably dierent from those in Miyagawa (2001a). 
A (decision) rule is a mapping ' that associates with each R 2 R
N
an alter-
native, denoted by '(R) = ('
1
(R); '
2
(R)). Pareto-optimality says that for each
preference prole the chosen alternative cannot be changed in such a way that no
agent is worse o and some agent is better o. Given S  N and R 2 R
N
, let
E(R
S
) denote the set of Pareto-optimal (or ecient) alternatives for R
S
. Formally,
E(R
S
) = fy 2 [0; 1]
M
j for all x 2 [0; 1]
M
, if for some i 2 S, xP
i
y, then for some j 2 S,
yP
j
xg.
4
Pareto-Optimality: For all R 2 R
N
, '(R) 2 E(R).
For Pareto-optimality to hold it is not sucient that for each public good the
selected location belongs to [p(R); p(R)]. For every chosen alternative it is necessary
that the closed interval having as two endpoints the two selected locations contains
at least one peak. The straightforward proof is left to the reader.
Lemma 2.2 Let ' be a rule. Then ' satises Pareto-optimality if and only if for
all R 2 R
N
the following holds: (i) '
1
(R); '
2
(R) 2 [p(R); p(R)], and (ii) there exists
i 2 N such that p(R
i
) 2 ['
1
(R); '
2
(R)].
By Lemma 2.2, the set of ecient alternatives depends only on the peaks of the
prole.
Remark 2.3 For all R 2 R
N
, let E(R
max
) denote the set of Pareto-optimal alter-
natives in [0; 1]
M
when we extend preferences maximally. It is easy to see that for
all x 2 [0; 1]
M
, x 2 E(R
max
) if and only if (i) x
1
; x
2
2 [p(R); p(R)] and (ii) for some
i; j 2 N , p(R
i
); p(R
j
) 2 [x
1
; x
2
], x
1
P
i
x
2
, and x
2
P
j
x
1
. For the lexicographic-extension
of preferences, Pareto-optimality is weaker than for the max-extension. For all R 2
R
N
such that p(R) < p(R), E(R
max
)  E(R). Generally the set E(R) is considerably
larger than E(R
max
). For example, let R 2 R
N
be such that fp(R
i
) j i 2 Ng = f0; 1g.
Then E(R
max
) = f(0; 1)g  ([0; 1] f1g) [ (f0g  [0; 1]) = E(R). 
The solidarity property we discuss is welfare-domination under preference-replace-
ment, or for short replacement-domination, introduced by Moulin (1987). It requires
that when the preference relation of some agent changes, the welfares of all other
agents are aected in the same direction.
Replacement-Domination: For all j 2 N , and all R;

R 2 R
N
such that R
Nnfjg
=

R
Nnfjg
, either [for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R
i
'(

R)] or [for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(

R)R
i
'(R)].
3 Single-Peaked Preference Rules
Miyagawa (2001a) shows that when n  4 and we extend preferences from [0,1] to
alternatives maximally, only the following two rules satisfy Pareto-optimality and
5
replacement-domination.
5
Left-Peaks Rule, L: For all R 2 R
N
, if p(R) = p(R), then L(R)  (p(R); p(R)),
and otherwise, L(R)  (p(R);minfp(R
j
) j j 2 N and p(R) < p(R
j
)g).
Right-Peaks Rule, G: For allR 2 R
N
, if p(R) = p(R), then G(R)  (p(R); p(R)),
and otherwise, G(R)  (maxfp(R
j
) j j 2 N and p(R
j
) < p(R)g; p(R)).
By Lemma 2.2, the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule satisfy Pareto-optimality.
However, both rules violate replacement-domination when agents compare alterna-
tives lexicographically.
Example 3.1 Let n  3 and R 2 R
N
be such that p(R
1
) = 0, p(R
2
) =
1
2
, p(R
3
) = 1,
and for all i 2 Nnf1; 2; 3g, p(R
i
) 2 f0; 1g. Let

R 2 R
N
be such that

R
Nnf2g
= R
Nnf2g
and p(

R
2
) =
2
3
. Then L(R) = (0;
1
2
) and L(

R) = (0;
2
3
). In particular, L(R)P
1
L(

R)
and L(

R)P
3
L(R). Thus, the left-peaks rule violates replacement-domination. Simi-
larly, the right-peaks rule violates replacement-domination. 
A \constant" rule selecting for each preference prole the same alternative satises
replacement-domination, but not Pareto-optimality. Therefore, in our model Pareto-
optimality and replacement-domination are independent.
Each rule satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination is described
by a continuous and single-peaked binary relation over [0; 1]. Here is an example of
such a rule when the single-peaked preference relation is continuous and symmetric
around the peak
1
3
.
Example 3.2 We represent the symmetric single-peaked preference relation with
peak
1
3
by its corresponding indierence map. Let f : [0;
2
3
] ! [0;
2
3
] be such that for
all x 2 [0;
2
3
], f(x) 
2
3
  x. Then f(
1
3
) =
1
3
. For all R 2 R
N
, we dene the rule

f
as follows: (a) if p(R) >
1
3
, then 
f
(R)  (p(R); p(R)); (b) if p(R) <
1
3
, then

f
(R)  (p(R); p(R)); and (c) if
1
3
2 [p(R); p(R)] and j 2 ft 2 N j for all i 2 N ,
5
In the trivial case, when all peaks coincide, a rule satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-
domination only needs to locate one good at the unanimous peak. We refer to Miyagawa (2001a)
for the details.
6
jp(R
i
) 
1
3
j  jp(R
t
) 
1
3
jg, then 
f
(R) 2 f(p(R
j
); f(p(R
j
))); (f(p(R
j
)); p(R
j
))g. When
p(R
1
)  : : :  p(R
l
) 
1
3
 p(R
l+1
)  : : :  p(R
n
), Figure 2 illustrates Case (c) for
j = l. 
[Figure 2 enters around here.]
Before we formally dene our rules, we introduce an equivalent representation of
a single-peaked preference relation over [0; 1].
Let R
0
2 R. Then 0R
0
1 or 1P
0
0. Suppose that 0R
0
1. Since R
0
is continuous,
for some b 2 [p(R
0
); 1], 0I
0
b. For all x 2 [0; b], let f(x) 2 [0; b] be such that xI
0
f(x)
and the following holds: (i) when x  p(R
0
), f(x)  p(R
0
), and (ii) when x  p(R
0
),
f(x)  p(R
0
). Because R
0
is continuous, it follows that f is continuous. Therefore,
with R
0
we associate a unique function f : [0; b] ! [0; b] such that f is continuous,
f = f
 1
(this follows from R
0
being a preference relation), and f is strictly decreasing
(this follows from single-peakedness of R
0
). In particular, f possesses as a unique xed
point p(R
0
), i.e. f(p(R
0
)) = p(R
0
). Furthermore, associated with such a function is
a unique single-peaked preference relation on [0,1].
Let f : [0; b] ! [0; b] (or, alternatively, f : [b; 1] ! [b; 1]) be a continuous strictly
decreasing function such that f(0) = b (f(b) = 1) and f = f
 1
(f is symmetric).
Denote by a its unique xed point and by F the set of all such functions.
Single-Peaked Preference Rules, 
f
: Given f 2 F , the single-peaked preference
rule 
f
based on f is dened as follows. For all R 2 R
N
such that p(R
i
1
)     
p(R
i
n
),
 if a =2 [p(R); p(R)], then

f
(R) 
(
(p(R); p(R)) when a < p(R);
(p(R); p(R)) when p(R) < a:
 if p(R
i
l
)  a  p(R
i
l+1
), then

f
(R) 
(
(p(R
i
l
); f(p(R
i
l
))) when f(p(R
i
l
))  p(R
i
l+1
);
(f(p(R
i
l+1
)); p(R
i
l+1
)) otherwise.
7
Theorem 3.3 below says that if N contains at least 3 agents, then every decision
rule satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination is a single-peaked pref-
erence rule. Section 4 contains the proof of Theorem 3.3. Note that when N contains
only two agents, replacement-domination has no bite.
Theorem 3.3 Let n  3. Then the single-peaked preference rules are the only rules
satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination.
Remark 3.4 In Miyagawa (2001a) we have to distinguish two cases. If N contains
at least four agents, then the left-peaks rule and the right-peaks rule are the only rules
satisfying Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. If N contains three agents,
then any rule choosing for each prole two distinct peaks satises Pareto-optimality
and replacement-domination. In Theorem 3.3, there is no distinction between these
two cases. 
Each single-peaked preference rule satises anonymity (the rule is symmetric in
its arguments) and coalitional strategy-proofness (no group of agents can gain by
jointly mispresenting their true preferences), as the careful reader may check. There-
fore, other rules than rules choosing for each public good the corresponding location
according to some median operation may satisfy strategy-proofness and additional
axioms.
6
Note that we do not require the above properties, they are implied by
Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination.
Finally we discuss the location of three public facilities. The result of Miyagawa
(2001a) generalizes to these cases as follows:
7
If n  5, then a rule satises Pareto-
optimality and replacement-domination with respect to the max-extension if and only
if either for all proles the three dierent smallest peaks are chosen, or for all proles
the three dierent greatest peaks are chosen.
It is not obvious how to extend a single-peaked preference rule to the location of
three goods. There are two single-peaked preference rules which can be extended in a
straightforward way: it is the rule choosing for all proles and all facilities the smallest
peak (call this rule the smallest-peak rule) and the rule choosing for all proles and all
6
The rst who characterized median solutions for one public good economies was Moulin (1980).
7
Personal communication with E. Miyagawa at the Fourth International Meeting of the Society
for Social Choice and Welfare, 1998, Vancouver, BC, Can.
8
facilities the greatest peak (call this rule the greatest-peak rule).
8
The smallest-peak
rule and the greatest-peak rule satisfy Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination
with respect to the lexicographic extension when we locate three facilities.
4 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Throughout this section let n  3 and ' be a rule satisfying Pareto-optimality and
replacement-domination. The following implications will be useful.
First, we prove that for any two ecient alternatives, if all agents are indierent
between them, then the two alternatives are the same.
Lemma 4.1 For all S  N , all R 2 R
N
, and all x; y 2 E(R
S
), if for all i 2 S, xI
i
y,
then x = y.
Proof. Let j 2 S be such that p(R
j
) = min
i2S
p(R
i
). Since x; y 2 E(R
S
), p(R
j
) 
x
1
 x
2
and p(R
j
)  y
1
 y
2
. Because xI
j
y, it follows that x
1
= y
1
and x
2
= y
2
.
Hence, x = y. 
Second, if the preference relation of some agent changes and the choices of the rule
at the initial and at the new prole are Pareto-optimal for the prole consisting of the
remaining agents' preferences, then the same alternative is chosen for both proles.
Lemma 4.2 Let j 2 N and R;

R 2 R
N
be such that R
Nnfjg
=

R
Nnfjg
. If '(R); '(

R) 2
E(R
Nnfjg
), then '(R) = '(

R).
Proof. By replacement-domination, either [for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R
i
'(

R)] or [for
all i 2 Nnfjg, '(

R)R
i
'(R)]. Since '(R); '(

R) 2 E(R
Nnfjg
), then for all i 2 Nnfjg,
'(R)I
i
'(

R). Hence, by Lemma 4.1, '(R) = '(

R). 
8
For two public goods, the smallest-peak rule and the greatest-peak rule, respectively, are the
single-peaked preference rules where the peak of the single-peaked preference relation is at 0 and at
1, respectively.
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Third, if the preference relation of some agent changes and all Pareto-optimal
alternatives at the new prole are also ecient for the prole consisting of the re-
maining agents' preferences, then all these agents weakly prefer the alternative chosen
by the rule for the new prole to the initially chosen alternative.
Lemma 4.3 Let j 2 N and R;

R 2 R
N
be such that R
Nnfjg
=

R
Nnfjg
. If E(

R) =
E(R
Nnfjg
), then for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(

R)R
i
'(R).
Proof. By replacement-domination, either [for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(

R)R
i
'(R)] or [for
all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R
i
'(

R)]. Suppose that the assertion of Lemma 4.3 does not
hold. Thus, for all i 2 Nnfjg, '(R)R
i
'(

R), and for some h 2 Nnfjg, '(R)P
h
'(

R).
Because E(

R) = E(R
Nnfjg
), '(

R) 2 E(R
Nnfjg
). The previous two facts constitute a
contradiction. 
Successive applications of Lemma 4.2 yield the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4 Let R 2 R
N
be such that jfp(R
i
) j i 2 Ngj  n  1. For all

R 2 R
N
, if
fp(

R
i
) j i 2 Ng = fp(R
i
) j i 2 Ng, then '(

R) = '(R).
The next lemma is an important step of the proof of Theorem 3.3. It says that for
any preference prole, the open interval having as endpoints the two chosen locations
contains no peak.
Lemma 4.5 For all R 2 R
N
and all i 2 N , p(R
i
) =2 ]'
1
(R); '
2
(R)[.
Proof. Suppose that for some R 2 R
N
and some j 2 N ,
p(R
j
) 2 ]'
1
(R); '
2
(R)[: (1)
Without loss of generality, we suppose that j =2 f1; 2g, p(R
1
) = p(R), and p(R
2
) =
p(R). By successive applications of Lemma 4.2 we may assume that for all i 2
Nnf1; 2; jg, p(R
i
) = p(R
j
).
Let

R 2 R
N
be such that

R
Nnf2g
= R
Nnf2g
and

R
2
= R
j
. Thus, E(

R) =
E(R
Nnf2g
). By Lemma 4.3, for all i 2 Nnf2g,
'(

R)R
i
'(R): (2)
10
Claim 1: '
2
(

R) = p(

R) = p(R
j
).
Proof of Claim 1. Suppose that
'
2
(

R) < p(R
j
): (3)
Let R
0
j
2 R be such that p(R)P
0
j
'
2
(

R) and p(R
0
j
) = p(R
j
), and let

R
0
= (

R
Nnfjg
; R
0
j
).
By Lemma 4.4,
'(

R
0
) = '(

R): (4)
Let R
0
= (R
Nnfjg
; R
0
j
). If p(R
j
) 2 f'
1
(R
0
); '
2
(R
0
)g, then by Lemma 4.3, '
2
(

R
0
) =
p(R
j
), which contradicts (3) and (4). Hence, by (1), Pareto-optimality and replacement-
domination,
9
'
1
(R
0
) < p(R
j
) < '
2
(R
0
):
Thus, since p(R)P
0
j
'
2
(

R) and by using (4),we obtain '(R
0
)P
0
j
'(

R
0
), which contradicts
Lemma 4.3. 
Let
~
R 2 R
N
be such that
~
R
Nnf1g
= R
Nnf1g
and
~
R
1
= R
j
. By the same arguments
as in Claim 1 it follows that '
1
(
~
R) = p(
~
R) = p(R
j
). To summarize, Claim 1, the
previous fact, replacement-domination, and (1) imply that
'
1
(
~
R) = p(R
j
); p(R
j
) < '
2
(
~
R);
and
'
1
(

R) < p(R
j
); '
2
(

R) = p(R
j
):
Let

R
1
2 R
N
be such that p(

R
1
1
) = p(

R), for all i 2 Nnf1g, p(

R
1
i
) = p(R
j
),
'
1
(

R)

P
1
2
'
2
(
~
R), and '
2
(
~
R)

P
1
3
'
1
(

R). Also, let

R
2
2 R
N
be such that

R
2
Nnf1g
=

R
1
Nnf1g
and p(

R
2
1
) = p(
~
R). By Lemma 4.4,
'(

R
1
) = '(

R) and '(

R
2
) = '(
~
R): (5)
By denition of

R
1
2
and

R
1
3
, '(

R)

P
1
2
'(
~
R) and '(
~
R)

P
1
3
'(

R). Since

R
1
Nnf1g
=

R
2
Nnf1g
and (5), the previous relations contradict replacement-domination. 
9
Note that when N = f1; 2; 3g we cannot conclude '(R
0
) = '(R).
11
The remaining proof of Theorem 3.3 is divided into two parts. In the rst part
we show Theorem 3.3 when N contains three agents. In the second part we use the
three agents case to establish Theorem 3.3 for the general case.
Three Agents Case: N = f1; 2; 3g.
We show that ' satises anonymity and peaks-onliness.
Lemma 4.6 ' satises anonymity, i.e. for all permutations  of N , '(R) = '((R)).
10
Proof. Let R 2 R
N
and  : N ! N be a permutation. If jfp(R
i
) j i 2 Ngj 2 f1; 2g,
then the conclusion follows from Lemma 4.4. Suppose that p(R
1
) < p(R
2
) < p(R
3
).
By Lemma 4.5, either '
1
(R); '
2
(R) 2 [p(R
1
); p(R
2
)] or '
1
(R); '
2
(R) 2 [p(R
2
); p(R
3
)].
Without loss of generality, we suppose that
'
1
(R); '
2
(R) 2 [p(R
1
); p(R
2
)]:
Let

R = (R
1
; R
2
; R
2
). By Lemma 4.2, '(

R) = '(R). By Lemma 4.4, '((

R)) =
'(

R). Thus, by the two previous facts,
'((

R)) = '(R): (6)
Next, we determine '((R)). If '
1
((R)); '
2
((R)) 2 [p(R
1
); p(R
2
)], then '((R)) 2
E(R
1
; R
2
). Hence, by Lemma 4.2, '((R)) = '((

R)). By (6), '((R)) = '(R),
which is the desired conclusion.
Suppose that '
2
((R)) > p(R
2
). Thus, by Lemma 4.5, '
1
((R))  p(R
2
). Let
~
R = (R
2
; R
2
; R
3
). Thus, by Lemmas 4.2 and 4.4, '(
~
R) = '((R)). We distinguish
three subcases.
Subcase 2.1: '
1
(R) = '
2
(R) = p(R
2
).
By Lemma 4.2, '(
~
R) = '(R). By Lemma 4.4, '(
~
R) = '((R)). The previous
two equalities contradict '(R) 6= '((R)).
Subcase 2.2: '
2
(R) < p(R
2
) < '
1
((R)).
Then '(

R) = '(R) and '(
~
R) = '((R)). Using the same arguments as in the
proof of Lemma 4.5 we derive a contradiction to replacement-domination.
Subcase 2.3: '
2
(R) = p(R
2
) (or p(R
2
) = '
1
((R))).
10
As usual, (R) is the permuted prole R according to .
12
By Subcase 2.1, '
1
(R) < p(R
2
). By Lemma 4.3, '(
~
R)R
2
'(R). Thus, '
1
(
~
R) =
p(R
2
). By Lemma 4.4, '(
~
R) = '((R)). Thus, p(R
2
) < '
2
(
~
R). Hence, by '(

R) =
'(R), '
1
(

R) < '
2
(

R) = p(R
2
) = '
1
(
~
R) < '
2
(
~
R). Using the same arguments as in
the proof of Lemma 4.5 we derive a contradiction to replacement-domination. 
Using similar arguments as in Lemma 4.6 it follows that ' satises peaks-onliness.
Lemma 4.7 ' satises peaks-onliness, i.e. for all R;

R 2 R
N
, if for all i 2 N ,
p(R
i
) = p(

R
i
), then '(R) = '(

R).
We construct a function f 2 F and show that ' = 
f
. Before we dene f we
introduce additional notation. Given x 2 [0; 1], R
x
2 R
N
denotes a preference prole
such that p(R
x
1
) = 0, p(R
x
2
) = x, and p(R
x
3
) = 1. Pareto-optimality implies that
'
1
(R
0
) = 0 or '
2
(R
0
) = 1. Without loss of generality, we suppose that '
1
(R
0
) = 0.
The case '
2
(R
0
) = 1 is symmetric by interchanging the roles of '
1
(R
0
) and '
2
(R
0
).
Dene b  '
2
(R
0
) and the function f : [0; b]! [0; b] as follows.
11
Denition of f : For all x 2 [0; b], when x < '
2
(R
x
), f(x)  '
2
(R
x
), and when
x  '
2
(R
x
), f(x)  '
1
(R
x
).
We prove in three subsequent lemmas that f 2 F .
Lemma 4.8 For all x 2 [0; b], f(x) 2 [0; b].
Proof. Let x 2 [0; b]. By Lemma 4.5, for all i 2 N , p(R
x
i
) =2 ]'
1
(R
x
); '
2
(R
x
)[. Thus,
if '
2
(R
x
) 2 ]b; 1], then '
1
(R
x
) 2 [x; 1]. Hence, '(R
0
)P
0
1
'(R
x
) and '(R
x
)P
0
3
'(R
0
), a
contradiction to replacement-domination. Thus, f(x) 2 [0; b]. 
Lemma 4.9 If x < x
0
, then f(x) > f(x
0
). Moreover, f = f
 1
.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.8, and replacement-domination, for all x 2 ]0; b[,
f(x) 2 ]0; b[. Thus, by Lemma 4.5, Pareto-optimality, and the denition of b, for all
x 2 [0; b],
'
1
(R
x
) = x or '
2
(R
x
) = x: (7)
11
When '
1
(R
0
) > 0, we dene b  '
1
(R
0
) and a function f : [b; 1]! [b; 1].
13
Let x; x
0
2 [0; b] be such that x < x
0
. Without loss of generality, we suppose that
'
1
(R
x
) = x. Thus, '
2
(R
x
)  x. If x
0
= '
2
(R
x
), then Lemma 4.5, replacement-
domination and (7) imply '(R
x
) = '(R
x
0
). Hence, by denition of f , f(x
0
) = x <
x
0
= f(x). If x
0
2 ]x; '
2
(R
x
)[, then by (7), x
0
2 f'
1
(R
x
0
); '
2
(R
x
0
)g. Thus, by
replacement-domination, '
1
(R
x
0
); '
2
(R
x
0
) 2 ]x; '
2
(R
x
)[ and f(x
0
) < '
2
(R
x
) = f(x).
If x
0
2 ]'
2
(R
x
); b], then by (7), x
0
2 f'
1
(R
x
0
); '
2
(R
x
0
)g. Thus, by replacement-
domination, '
1
(R
x
0
) < x and x
0
= '
2
(R
x
0
). By denition of f , f(x
0
) = '
1
(R
x
0
) <
x  f(x). Hence, f is strictly decreasing.
Since f is strictly decreasing, then f
 1
is well-dened. For the second part, let
x 2 [0; b]. By (7) and the denition of f , (x; f(x)) = '(R
x
) or (f(x); x) = '(R
x
). By
(7), f(x) 2 f'
1
(R
f(x)
); '
2
(R
f(x)
)g. Hence, by replacement-domination, '(R
f(x)
) =
'(R
x
). Thus, f(x) = f
 1
(x), the desired conclusion. 
Lemma 4.10 The function f is continuous.
Proof. It suces to prove that f is left-continuous and right-continuous. We only
show that f is left-continuous. Right-continuity can be similarly shown. Let x 2
[0; b] and (x
k
)
k2N
be a strictly increasing sequence converging to x. By Lemma 4.9,
(f(x
k
))
k2N
is a strictly decreasing sequence. Let x  lim
k!1
f(x
k
). If (f(x
k
))
k2N
does not converge to f(x), then, by Lemma 4.9, f(x) < x. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: x  f(x).
Consider R
1
2
(f(x)+x)
. By (7) in the proof of Lemma 4.9,
1
2
(f(x) + x) 2 f'
1
(R
1
2
(f(x)+x)
); '
2
(R
1
2
(f(x)+x)
)g:
Thus, by replacement-domination, '
1
(R
1
2
(f(x)+x)
) < x. Hence, for some k 2 N , x
k
2
]'
1
(R
1
2
(f(x)+x)
); x[. Thus, f(x
k
) > x > '
2
(R
1
2
(f(x)+x)
). Because '(R
x
k
) = (x
k
; f(x
k
))
it follows that '(R
1
2
(f(x)+x))
)P
x
k
1
'(R
x
k
) and '(R
x
k
)P
x
k
3
'(R
1
2
(f(x)+x))
), which contra-
dicts replacement-domination.
Case 2: x > f(x).
Let " > 0 be such that f(x) + " < minfx; xg. By (7),
f(x) + " 2 f'
1
(R
f(x)+"
); '
2
(R
f(x)+"
)g:
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Thus, by replacement-domination, '
2
(R
f(x)+"
) < x. Hence, for some k 2 N , x
k
2
]'
2
(R
f(x)+"
); x[. By our choice of ", f(x
k
) > f(x) + ". Because '(R
x
k
) = (x
k
; f(x
k
))
it follows that '(R
f(x)+"
)P
x
k
1
'(R
x
k
) and '(R
x
k
)P
x
k
3
'(R
f(x)+"
), which contradicts
replacement-domination. 
By Lemmas 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10, f 2 F . Let a 2 [0; b] be such that f(a) = a. The
following lemma completes the proof of Theorem 3.3 for the three agents case.
Lemma 4.11 ' = 
f
.
Proof. Let R 2 R
N
. By anonymity, we may suppose that p(R
1
)  p(R
2
)  p(R
3
).
We distinguish three cases.
Case 1: a 2 [p(R); p(R)].
Without loss of generality, we suppose that for some j 2 N , 
f
(R) = (p(R
j
); f(p(R
j
))).
Thus, j 2 f1; 2g. If j = 1, then
'(R
p(R
1
)
) = '(R
3
; R
p(R
1
)
f2;3g
) = '(R
3
; R
p(R
1
)
2
; R
2
) = '(R);
where the rst equality follows from replacement-domination and f(p(R
1
))  p(R
3
),
the second from replacement-domination and p(R
2
) =2 ]p(R
1
); f(p(R
1
))[, and the
third from anonymity and peaks-onliness. Thus, by denition of f and 
f
, 
f
(R) =

f
(R
p(R
1
)
) = '(R
p(R
1
)
) = '(R), the desired conclusion.
Let j = 2. Then by replacement-domination, f(p(R
2
))  p(R
3
), anonymity, and
peaks-onliness,
'(R
p(R
2
)
) = '(R
3
; R
p(R
2
)
f2;3g
) = '(R
p(R
2
)
3
; R
2
; R
3
): (8)
By Lemma 4.9, f = f
 1
and '(R
p(R
2
)
) = '(R
f(p(R
2
))
). Thus, by using the same
arguments as above and p(R
1
)  p(R
2
) = '
1
(R
f(p(R
2
))
),
'(R
p(R
2
)
) = '(R
f(p(R
2
))
) = '(R
f(p(R
2
))
f1;2g
; R
1
) = '(R
2
; R
f(p(R
2
))
2
; R
1
) = '(R
1
; R
2
; R
f(p(R
2
))
2
):
(9)
Now by (8), (9), and replacement-domination, '(R
p(R
2
)
) = '(R). Thus, by denition
of f and 
f
, 
f
(R) = 
f
(R
p(R
2
)
) = '(R
p(R
2
)
) = '(R), the desired conclusion.
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Case 2: p(R) < a.
Let

R 2 R
N
be such that p(

R
2
) = 1 and

R
Nnf2g
= R
Nnf2g
. By Case 1, '(

R) =
(p(R); f(p(R))). Let

R
0
2 R
N
be such that p(

R
0
2
) = p(

R
1
) and

R
0
Nnf2g
=

R
Nnf2g
.
By Lemma 4.3, for all i 2 Nnf2g, '(

R
0
)

R
i
'(

R). Hence, by peaks-onliness, '(

R
0
) =
(p(

R); p(

R)). Thus, by replacement-domination,
'(R) = '(

R
0
) = (p(R); p(R)) = 
f
(R);
the desired conclusion.
Case 3: a < p(R).
If p(R) 2 ]a; b], then the same proof of Case 2 yields the desired conclusion.
Let p(R) 2 ]b; 1]. Let

R 2 R
N
be such that p(

R
2
) = b and

R
Nnf2g
= R
Nnf2g
.
By the previous fact, '(

R) = (b; b). Since b < p(R), Pareto-optimality implies
'(R)

P
3
'(

R). Thus, by replacement-domination and peaks-onliness, '
1
(R) = p(R).
Suppose that '
2
(R) > p(R). Let R
0
2 R
N
be such that p(R
0
2
) =
1
2
(p(R) + '
2
(R))
and R
0
Nnf2g
= R
Nnf2g
. By the previous argument, '
1
(R
0
) = p(R). Hence, by Lemma
4.5, '
2
(R
0
)  p(R
0
2
) < '
2
(R). Thus, '(R
0
)P
1
'(R) and '(R)P
3
'(R
0
), a contradiction
to replacement-domination. Therefore,
'(R) = (p(R); p(R)) = 
f
(R);
the desired conclusion. 
General Case: N = f1; : : : ; ng and n  4.
Let
~
N  f1; 2; 3g. We associate with ' a rule ~' : R
~
N
! [0; 1]
M
dened for three
agents in the following way. For all
~
R 2 R
~
N
, let
~'(
~
R)  '(
~
R
1
;
~
R
2
; (
~
R
3
)
i2Nnf1;2g
):
Obviously ~' inherits Pareto-optimality from '.
Lemma 4.12 ~' satises replacement-domination.
Proof. Let j 2
~
N and R;R
0
2 R
~
N
be such that R
~
Nnfjg
= R
0
~
Nnfjg
. If j 2 f1; 2g, then
the assertion follows from replacement-domination of '. Let j = 3. By denition of
~', n  4, and Lemma 4.4, it follows that
~'(R) = '(R
1
; R
2
; (R
3
)
i2Nnf1;2g
) = '(R
1
; (R
2
)
i2Nnf1;3g
; R
3
) (10)
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and (by R
~
Nnf3g
= R
0
~
Nnf3g
)
~'(R
0
) = '(R
1
; R
2
; (R
0
3
)
i2Nnf1;2g
) = '(R
1
; (R
2
)
i2Nnf1;3g
; R
0
3
): (11)
Hence, by (10) and (11), ~' inherits replacement-domination from '. 
Because ~' satises Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination, the three agents
case implies that there exists f 2 F such that ~' =
~

f
(where
~

f
: R
~
N
! [0; 1]
M
).
Let R 2 R
N
. Then by Pareto-optimality and Lemma 4.5 there exists j 2 N
such that p(R
j
) 2 f'
1
(R); '
2
(R)g. Let k; h 2 N be such that p(R
k
) = p(R) and
p(R
h
) = p(R). Let

R 2 R
N
be such that

R
fj;k;hg
= R
fj;k;hg
and for all i 2 Nnfj; k; hg,

R
i
= R
j
. Successive application of Lemma 4.2 yields '(

R) = '(R). Let
~
R 2 R
N
be
such that
~
R
1
=

R
j
,
~
R
2
=

R
k
, and for all i 2 Nnf1; 2g,
~
R
i
=

R
h
. Because n  4,
jfp(

R
i
) j i 2 Ngj  3, and fp(

R
i
) j i 2 Ng = fp(
~
R
i
) j i 2 Ng, Lemma 4.4 yields
'(
~
R) = '(

R). Hence, '(R) = '(
~
R).
Now by denition, '(
~
R) = ~'(
~
R
f1;2;3g
). Thus, by ~' =
~

f
and '(R) = '(
~
R),
'(R) =
~

f
(
~
R
f1;2;3g
). Because 
f
: R
N
! [0; 1]
M
satises anonymity and for all i 2
Nnfj; k; hg, p(R
i
) 2 [p(R); '
1
(R)][['
2
(R); p(R)], it follows that 
f
(R) =
~

f
(
~
R
f1;2;3g
).
Hence, '(R) = 
f
(R) and ' = 
f
, the desired conclusion.
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1
Figure 1: The preference R
1
is symmetric around the peak 0:5. The shaded area
is the weak upper contour set at (0.2,0.6) when we extend R
1
lexicographically.
Note that the dotted line segments [0; 0:2[f0:4g, [0; 0:2[f0:6g, f0:4g]0:8; 1], and
f0:6g]0:8; 1] do not belong to this upper contour set. Furthermore, the four bullet
points (0.2,0.4), (0.2,0.6), (0.4,0.8), and (0.6,0.8) are all alternatives in [0; 1]
M
that
are indierent to (0.2,0.6).
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1
3
p(R)

f
1
(R) 
f
2
(R)
p(R
l
) p(R
l+1
) p(R)
Figure 2: Illustration of Case (c) when j = l in Example 3.2.
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